Academic (University) preparation with worked examples, written practice and independent learning assessments.
Independent university-level study of Algorithmic Game Theory. This original curriculum draws on public academic subject descriptions; it is not an official faculty syllabus, university credit, accreditation or an Ivy League qualification. Topics covered: Utility models; Strategic games; Dominance; Nash equilibrium. Mixed equilibria; Fixed-point arguments; Equilibrium computation; Complexity barriers. Congestion games; Potential functions; Routing games; Price of anarchy. Auction formats; Truthfulness; Revenue equivalence; Optimal auctions. Mechanism design; Social choice; Incentive compatibility; VCG mechanisms. Matching markets; Stable matching; School allocation; Market clearing. Online markets; Learning in games; Regret minimization; Correlated equilibrium. Fair division; Algorithmic incentives; Market failures; Mechanism evaluation. Projects use safe simulations, public datasets or textual analysis; specialist subject review is required. Includes lessons, supplementary YouTube tutorials, practical exercises, quizzes and free/paid practice tests. Erudex is independent, not affiliated with the source institution or awarding body. Its 80% learning checks are not official grades or university credit. Content requires qualified subject review before use as a complete teaching programme.
One complete track with its own final exam and certificate.
Independent university-level study of Algorithmic Game Theory. This original curriculum draws on public academic subject descriptions; it is not an official faculty syllabus, university credit, accreditation or an Ivy League qualification. Topics covered: Utility models; Strategic games; Dominance; Nash equilibrium. Mixed equilibria; Fixed-point arguments; Equilibrium computation; Complexity barriers. Congestion games; Potential functions; Routing games; Price of anarchy. Auction formats; Truthfulness; Revenue equivalence; Optimal auctions. Mechanism design; Social choice; Incentive compatibility; VCG mechanisms. Matching markets; Stable matching; School allocation; Market clearing. Online markets; Learning in games; Regret minimization; Correlated equilibrium. Fair division; Algorithmic incentives; Market failures; Mechanism evaluation. Projects use safe simulations, public datasets or textual analysis; specialist subject review is required.
Utility models; Strategic games; Dominance; Nash equilibrium